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OR many years, barium enema was the only way
to obtain a complete structural examination of
the colon, short of surgery. Development of the
double-contrast barium enema improved the ability
of the method to detect subtle lesions, and this is
the only kind of barium enema that is appropriate
for detecting polyps and potentially curable cancers.
With the advent of fiberoptic technology and the
widespread use of colonoscopy in the 1970s, the
role of barium enema came into question. As evi-
dence of the effectiveness of screening for colorectal
cancer accumulated, followed by consensus on the
value of screening programs, skepticism about the val-
ue of barium enema intensified and at times became





Disagreement about the value of barium enema
has persisted in the absence of scientifically credible
information about the accuracy of barium enema rel-
ative to the gold standard of colonoscopy. Contro-
versy has also persisted because of differing views of
the criteria that should be used to determine which
method is better. Screening and diagnostic tests are
judged not only on the basis of their accuracy in de-
tecting and ruling out lesions but also on the basis
of their safety, convenience, acceptance by patients,
cost, and cost effectiveness, as well as on the number





 With respect to some of these consider-
ations, especially safety and cost, barium enema is
clearly better. However, an acceptable level of accu-
racy is also an essential characteristic of a test.
Whether or not colonoscopy is a better way to ex-
amine the colon, it has been replacing barium ene-
mas in recent years. The appeal of endoscopic tech-
nology, the ability to detect and remove lesions during
a single procedure, and the influence of the gastro-
enterology community have been persuasive. But this
shift in fashion does not necessarily represent a wise
policy decision.
At last there is a good study of the accuracy of
barium enema: the report by Winawer and colleagues






 Winawer et al. studied
580 patients who were at increased risk for polyps
(because they had already had at least one) and who
were willing to undergo both double-contrast bari-
um enema and colonoscopic examination as part of
a study designed to assess surveillance strategies. Both
endoscopists and radiologists were apparently skilled
and were unaware of the results of the other type of
examination. They performed these tests more or
F
 
less concurrently, with an average interval between
examinations of 16 days. The authors were able to
study a large enough number of patients and polyps
to yield relatively precise estimates of the rate of de-
tection of clinically important subgroups of neoplasms,
such as large polyps and localized cancers, with the
use of barium enema.
Barium enemas did not fare well in this compari-
son. This type of examination found abnormalities
in only a third of patients who had one or more ad-
enomas on colonoscopic examination (rate of detec-
tion, 39 percent; 95 percent confidence interval, 33
to 45 percent). The findings on barium enema were
positive in the case of 18 percent of paired examina-
tions in which no polyps were detected on colono-
scopic examination during either the original, blind-
ed examination or a second, unblinded examination
of areas in which a polyp had been identified by bar-
ium enema. Barium enema detected only about half
the adenomas larger than 1.0 cm that were identified
by colonoscopic examination (rate of detection, 46
percent; 95 percent confidence interval, 26 to 67
percent).
Barium enema was especially ineffective in identi-
fying small polyps, detecting only 21 percent of the
polyps identified by colonoscopic examination as be-
ing 0.5 cm or smaller. It is less important, however,
to find small polyps than large ones. In a study of
3371 adenomas in 1867 patients, high-grade dyspla-
sia was found in only about 2 percent of adenomas
that were 0.1 to 0.5 cm and in 24 percent of those




 True, some small polyps
may have dysplastic changes or even be cancerous,
so it is not entirely safe to ignore them. But a policy
to pursue all diminutive polyps aggressively would
drastically increase the inconvenience, risk, and costs
associated with screening programs for colorectal
cancer and would increase the number of lives saved
relatively little.
To the extent that colonoscopic examination is an
imperfect standard, it might make barium enema ex-
aminations look bad by comparison. For example,
with the use of colonoscopic examination as the
standard, lesions found on barium enema that were
missed by colonoscopic examination would be in-
correctly classified as false positive results. A study in
which the results of back-to-back colonoscopic exam-
inations were compared showed that during colono-
scopic examination by a skilled endoscopist, 25 per-
cent of adenomas that were 1.0 cm or smaller were
missed, as compared with only 6 percent of those




 The apparent false positive
rate of barium enema in the blinded part of the
study by Winawer et al. was 18 percent and was re-
duced to 14 percent, a more accurate estimate of the
true rate, when the area identified as abnormal on bar-
ium enema was reexamined by a second (unblinded)
colonoscopy.
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Can the results of this study of surveillance exam-
inations in people with a history of polyps be gen-
eralized to other situations in which barium enema
is used — for example, for the diagnostic evaluation
of patients with abnormal results on screening tests
for colorectal cancer, such as fecal occult-blood tests
and sigmoidoscopy? I see no compelling reason why
the results for a given kind of polyp would differ
substantially depending on the reason for the test.
The greater leap is in generalizing results obtained
by the carefully selected endoscopists and radiolo-
gists participating in the study to the results of ex-
aminations performed in usual clinical practice.
The search for polyps is based on the widely held
belief that nearly all colorectal cancers arise from ad-









 but they have been
considered an uncommon precursor to sporadic can-
cers. However, the results of a recent British study
of 1000 patients who underwent colonoscopic ex-





of the adenomas that were found were flat. They were
recognized on the basis of the presence of erythema
or irregular mucosal folds — a finding that was en-
hanced by spraying the mucosa with a dye. These
flat adenomas could have been missed in earlier se-
ries of patients, especially if the endoscopist believed
that flat adenomas were uncommon.
In the British study, the proportion of adenomas
with severe dysplasia or Dukes’ stage A carcinoma
was higher among patients with large flat lesions than
among those with small flat lesions — as is true for
large as compared with small adenomatous polyps
— and was higher for large flat lesions than for large
polyps. If these observations are supported by the
findings of other studies in which special efforts are
made to detect flat adenomas, it will represent a se-
rious strike against any method of examining the co-





 that attempts to detect clinically important
adenomas by identifying mass lesions that project into
the colonic lumen.
Recent guidelines for the screening for, diagnosis
of, and surveillance for colorectal cancer have given
barium enema the benefit of the doubt by including




 No single study, even one as rig-
orous as the study by Winawer et al., can answer a
question unequivocally. But those who are skeptical
about the value of barium-enema examinations now
have a strong basis for their reservations. An accept-
able level of accuracy is essential. The ability of bar-
ium enema to detect clinically important polyps is
not good enough, in my opinion, to use this meth-
od for the surveillance of patients who are at in-
creased risk for polyps or for a diagnostic evaluation
of the colon. Barium enema may still have a role in
screening — where expectations regarding the accu-
racy of findings are not as high — but it is unclear
exactly what this role should be. For surveillance and
diagnosis, however, barium enema should be used only
when colonoscopy is not available or is contraindi-
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 Bennett et al. describe
11 cases of thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpu-





 The evidence linking clo-
pidogrel to the development of thrombotic throm-
bocytopenic purpura is strengthened by the finding
that the disorder began within 14 days after the ini-
tiation of clopidogrel therapy in all but one patient. 
Thrombotic thrombocytopenic purpura is known
to occur in patients who are treated with ticlopidine,
a similar antiplatelet drug. The similarities between
ticlopidine and clopidogrel extend beyond their mech-
anism of action. Both drugs inhibit platelet aggrega-
tion in response to adenosine diphosphate by inhib-

















 and they are structurally similar de-
I
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rivatives of thienopyridine. However, the high inci-





 has led some to recom-





the perception that these adverse events do not oc-
cur with this drug. Thrombotic thrombocytopenic
purpura is one of the most serious adverse hemato-
logic effects of ticlopidine, with a frequency of at
least 1 case per 5000 patients. It was therefore reas-
suring that no such cases were reported among the
20,000 patients who received clopidogrel in clinical
trials.
After a drug is marketed and used by a large num-
ber of patients, previously unrecognized adverse ef-
fects are often identified, and some are severe enough
to result in the withdrawal of the drug from the
market. Therefore, steps must be taken to identify
quickly any new adverse effects after a drug is re-
leased. In the United States, the occurrence of such
effects is monitored by MedWatch, a voluntary re-
porting system operated by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). However, only 1 to 10 per-
cent of all reportable adverse effects are reported to
MedWatch, and the majority of these reports come
from drug companies. In the case of thrombotic
thrombocytopenic purpura in patients treated with
clopidogrel, the system clearly failed. Only 2 of the
11 cases described by Bennett et al. were originally
listed in MedWatch, so that if the authors had relied
only on that system, they would have missed this tox-
ic effect. A second approach is intensive post-mar-
keting surveillance of a well-defined cohort, but none
of the reported cases were identified in that manner
either.
Some adverse events are truly unexpected, where-
as others, though previously unrecognized, cannot
be described as wholly unexpected. Because ticlopi-
dine, an analogue of clopidogrel, caused thrombotic
thrombocytopenic purpura, it was appropriate to have
— as Bennett et al. had — a high index of suspicion
that clopidogrel could have similar effects. There-
fore, Bennett et al. contacted physicians who were
experts in the management of thrombotic thrombo-
cytopenic purpura and directors of blood banks in-
volved in the treatment of the disease to look for
cases that might have been associated with clopido-
grel use. Using this approach, they identified 9 of
their 11 cases. They could not, however, calculate
the frequency of thrombotic thrombocytopenic pur-
pura, because they did not ascertain the total num-
ber of patients who received clopidogrel in the pop-
ulation from which the 11 cases were drawn. Such
information would have demonstrated causality more
convincingly.
There are several lessons to be learned from this
report and from previous reports of drug-related






 We need to take a more ag-
gressive approach to the post-marketing surveillance
of new drugs, particularly if there is some a priori
reason to suspect that they may have adverse effects.
Fenfluramine was recognized as being associated







 recommended “active surveillance” for
this disease among patients who were taking appe-
tite suppressants. In the case of valvular heart dis-
ease, which was found to be associated with the use
of fenfluramine, active surveillance could have con-
sisted of collecting information from echocardiog-
raphers. Had this been done, it is likely that the re-
lation between valvular heart disease and fenfluramine
would have been recognized before 9 million Amer-




It is time for a new approach to drug safety. Pas-
sive post-marketing surveillance is not enough. When
there is reason to suspect a specific drug of causing
an adverse effect, studies to confirm or refute that
association should be undertaken by recruiting phy-
sicians who are likely to see the affected patients. The
issue is one of efficiency: 19.8 million patients (close
to 10 percent of the U.S. population) were exposed
to five drugs (bromfenac, dexfenfluramine, fenflura-
mine, mibefradil, and terfenadine) that were with-




 We must iden-
tify drug-related toxicity before such large numbers
of patients are exposed. For example, two new thia-
zolidinediones, rosiglitazone and pioglitazone, have
recently been marketed, even though the first mem-
ber of this class to be marketed — troglitazone — has
already been withdrawn because of hepatotoxicity.
These new drugs should be monitored in a targeted
fashion. Patients with abnormal liver function who
present to hepatologists and patients with hepatic fail-
ure who are seen by liver-transplantation units should
be carefully evaluated to determine whether the hep-
atotoxicity is related to the use of these drugs.
Treatment with a drug during the initial market-
ing of that drug should essentially be considered a
therapeutic experiment, since we cannot know ev-
erything about the drug at that time because not
enough patients have been exposed to it. However,
it is important to define specific hypotheses in ad-
vance and test them in the most efficient fashion. If
we judge drug safety to be an important issue, we
must be prepared to pay for the studies required to
ensure that safety. A means of funding an evaluation
of a drug’s safety after it is approved and marketed
needs to be developed that is independent of the
FDA and drug manufacturers. The article by Ben-
nett et al. emphasizes the value of nontraditional ap-
proaches to identifying drug-related adverse events
and should encourage the systematic incorporation
of such approaches into post-marketing surveillance.
When the index of suspicion is sufficiently high, such
an approach should be made a condition of drug ap-
proval, with appropriate safeguards in place to en-
sure that the recommended studies are actually com-
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ODERN information technology is rapidly
changing how new knowledge is discovered in
most fields of science, including medicine. This tech-
nology offers interesting possibilities in the develop-
ment of methods to understand diseases better, but
it also presents new ethical challenges. The new tech-
nology offers the possibility of mining large data sets
for knowledge, without a priori hypotheses, by sys-
tematically juxtaposing various data in the search for
the best fit. This kind of pure combinatorial analysis
may be particularly powerful in the case of the com-
mon diseases, most of which are complex and have
remained beyond the reach of the classic hypothesis-
driven approach to biomedical research. However, to
take full advantage of the new techniques, it is im-
portant to have access to large amounts of primary
data in one place. This calls for large data bases on
health care that can be mined for knowledge, either
alone or in combination with other data on disease
and health, such as variations in the human genome.
Three years ago, deCODE genetics, a genomics
company located in Iceland, proposed the construc-
tion of a centralized data base, called the Icelandic
Healthcare Database (IHD), with information from
the entire health care system of Iceland. One of the
principal advantages of this data base is the ability to
cross-reference phenotypic information with a large





pect that the IHD and other data bases of its kind
will provide ideal opportunities to study interactions
among genes and between genes and environment
in the pathogenesis of common diseases. The ulti-
mate goal is to discover new methods to diagnose,
prevent, and cure common diseases. The IHD will
also allow studies of the interface between health
care and the rest of society, which may, for example,
lead to a better understanding of how cost and ben-
efit are linked. The data-base proposal, however, raised
many questions about scientific ethics, protection of





Before conducting large-scale biomedical research
on a population, it is considered important to obtain




 After a vigorous
debate in Icelandic society, the Icelandic parliament
passed a law permitting the construction of the IHD,
a data base made up of information from the medi-




 The debate in-
M
 
cluded 700 newspaper articles, more than 100 radio
and television programs, and several town meetings
all across Iceland. On the eve of the parliamentary
vote, a poll showed that 75 percent of Icelanders
supported the passage of the bill, whereas 25 per-
cent were against it. The data-base law was passed by
the same margin, and since then support for it has
been growing. A poll taken by the Gallup organiza-
tion in the beginning of April 2000 showed that 90
percent of those who took a stand on the issue sup-
ported the data-base law, and 10 percent were against
it. The vigorous debate in Icelandic society over the
IHD was mostly constructive and had a substantial
effect on the final legislation and the data-base li-
cense that was eventually granted. Debate is one of
the most important mechanisms by which complex




According to the law, the data in the IHD will be
collected under the assumption of “presumed con-
sent.” Presumed consent is a nebulous concept, but
in the context of this project, we regard it as the
consent of society to the use of health care informa-
tion according to the norms of society. These norms
may vary from one society to another and may
change with time. It is important that the data in the
IHD will be only data from medical records that are
produced in the process of delivering health care.
Some argue that presumed consent is inconsistent
with the right of individuals to decide for themselves





presumed consent is the standard used for research
on health care data that is produced in the process
of delivering medical services. It is not certain that
we would have health care as we know it today if ex-
plicit consent had been a prerequisite for the use of
medical data. 
To enhance the authenticity of the presumed con-
sent in the case of the IHD, the law stipulates that





can request that their data not be entered into the
IHD by signing a form that is available at all health
care institutions in Iceland, including all clinics and
drugstores. In the list of those who have opted out
of the IHD, no names are shown and social-security
numbers are encrypted to diminish the likelihood
that opting out of the IHD will lead to discrimina-
tion. In April 2000 (17 months after the data-base
law was passed), a Gallup poll showed that 8.6 per-
cent of Icelanders were against the IHD; by that
time, 80 percent of that number, or 7 percent of the
nation, had opted out of the data base.
The law allows the cross-matching of medical in-
formation in the IHD and genotypic data, but only
data from individual persons who have consented





cross-referencing must be performed with methods
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approved by the Data Protection Commission of Ice-
land (Fig. 1). An unresolved issue is whether deCODE
will be allowed to ask for broad consent from par-
ticipants to correlate any information in the data base
with data on variance in their genomes (genotypic da-
ta). “Broad consent” as applied here indicates consent
in which the potential subjects cannot be informed
in the same detail required by informed consent.
Broad consent is a far cry from “blanket consent,”
which would give researchers an unrestricted right
to use the data or the biologic sample. With broad
consent to use the genotypic information to study
the genetics of health and disease it would be possi-
ble to use combinatorial analysis systematically to
seek the best fit between all regions in the genome
and all phenotypic variants recorded in the data base.
The interests at stake are not trivial, because, with-
out broad consent, the data base would be only an
extraordinarily effective tool for classic gene map-
ping, rather than a revolutionary method for study-
ing the interplay between genetics and environment
in human disease and health.
The majority of the international bioethics com-




Elias and Annas, for example, have promoted the use





members of this community, however, remain skepti-
cal of the wisdom of broad consent because of the dif-




Informed consent was devised to protect the auton-
omy of individual subjects against overzealous scien-
tists. Nobody should participate in biomedical re-
search unless he or she makes an informed decision
to do so, and nobody should be coerced or tricked
into making such a decision. The goal is to protect
the autonomy of the individual; the tool is informed
consent.
The demand that consent to research participa-
tion be informed is difficult to enforce and not al-
ways practical to achieve. It is possible to demand that
the consent process contain certain keys to aid un-
derstanding of the proposed research, but it is rarely
possible to determine whether the prospective par-
ticipant understands the proposal, or wants to un-
derstand it. That is why there is a universal policy pre-
cluding children or mentally impaired persons from
consenting to research. It is important to keep in
mind that part of our autonomy, our right to self-
determination, is the right to make uninformed and
even foolish decisions. Nevertheless, most would agree
that society should not sit idly by when the decision
to commit suicide is contemplated, nor when a de-





Some bioethicists now say that the main reason
that people cannot grant broad consent is that their
decision cannot be an informed one. Hence, the re-
quirement for informed consent has become a rea-
son to restrict the very autonomy it was originally
meant to protect. The right to self-determination is
a fundamental human right, and we believe it is the
right of individual persons to grant broad consent or
even blanket consent to the use of their biologic ma-
terial or of information about them.
Our view is that fully alert people of reasonable
intelligence should be allowed to give broad consent
for the scientific use of biologic samples and medical
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erately left out of this discussion any mention of ex-
periments that entail physical risk. Our argument
deals only with risk entailed by the use of medical-
records data.
We consider that consent for genetic research has
three components. The first is consent to the acquisi-
tion of the biologic material that is used as the source
of DNA. The second is consent to the genotyping
of the DNA. The third is consent to the use of the
genotypic information that results. The first two com-
ponents are the same for the IHD as for projects re-
lated to the genetics of individual diseases. In the
case of the IHD, the third component differs from
the study of individual diseases, because we ask for
broad consent. In both cases, however, the consent
requested is for the use of genotypic data to generate
knowledge about the nature of the group, rather than
knowledge about the individual person. The consent
process for correlating genotypic data with the med-
ical-records information contained in the IHD has
yet to be defined by the committees that will oversee
the IHD (described below). We assume, however,
that the consent process will not differ substantially
from that currently used for correlating data on gen-




All data entered into the IHD will be copied from
medical records that are filed under individual names
and social-security numbers at the various health care
institutions. These records are easily accessible be-
cause they are used by those who provide medical
services to patients, sometimes under urgent circum-
stances. In the IHD these records will be stored
with identification numbers encrypted by the Data
Protection Commission of Iceland, which receives
its charge under the Privacy Law of Iceland (Fig. 1).
Information will be retrievable from the data base
only for groups of 10 or more people, not individual
persons. Strict administrative procedures will protect
the data. Actually, the data contained in the IHD
would be much easier for unauthorized persons to
obtain from the original institutions where they are
stored in uncoded form.
Why should Icelanders trust a private company to
protect their personal health care information? It is
probably better for a private company to hold this
information than for the state to do so, since gov-
ernments can violate the privacy of individuals to ad-
vance the interests of society as a whole. Moreover,
if a health care data base managed by a private com-
pany violates privacy, the company can be closed
down. According to the Icelandic law, deCODE will
lose the license to develop and use the data base if
the conditions of the license, including the stipula-
tions regarding the protection of privacy, are not
met. Violations of the data-base law are also punish-
able by monetary fines and imprisonment.
The restrictions imposed on the IHD in order to
protect individual privacy make it difficult to con-
nect discoveries made through the use of the data
base directly with individual persons. The Icelandic
legislature decided that the protection of privacy was
more important than the possibility of immediate
benefits to individuals. However, if the appropriate
authorities granted permission, it would be relatively
easy to identify and contact all persons in Iceland
who had a particular risk factor for disease. Since all
discoveries made with use of the IHD will be based
on DNA from people who have granted explicit
consent, it will be possible to ask the donors wheth-
er they want their genotypes to be stored under
their names and whether they wish to be notified
about any associations between alleles they carry and
specific diseases or predispositions to the develop-
ment of disease. Notifying participants in research of
the results as they apply to them as individuals be-
fore the results have been confirmed and put in the
appropriate clinical context is always problematic. For
example, the discovery of a mutation in a gene that
is found in 100 percent of patients with a certain dis-
ease does not tell us in how large a proportion of
patients with the mutation the disease develops, nor
how reliable the test for the mutation is. A basic dis-
covery should always be validated clinically before it
is made known to individuals.
 
SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM AND COMMERCIAL 
INFLUENCES
 
Since the data that are entered into the IHD are
simply copies of data that will remain within health
care institutions, it is not easy to see how the data
base could restrict the freedom of science. There is,
however, some concern that the commercial mission
of private enterprise will influence the way research
on the data base is performed and how the results
are distributed and used. 
It is important to ensure that research based on
the IHD meets international ethical standards. There-
fore, the IHD will be subject to the oversight of four
government regulatory bodies: the Data Protection
Commission of Iceland (appointed by the ministry
of justice), an interdisciplinary bioethics committee,
the National Bioethics Committee, and an opera-
tional oversight committee (the last three appointed
by the minister of health).
The enormous value placed by the new economy
on high-technology companies has shifted the cre-
ation of value away from production and distribu-
tion and toward discovery, innovation, and develop-
ment. As a consequence, many more resources are
being funneled into innovation and discovery than
ever before, and private enterprise has increased, not
decreased, the pace of scientific discovery. Further-
more, the focus of the discovery of new knowledge
(at least in biology and information science) has drift-
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ed away from academia and toward industry. Time
alone will tell whether this is good or bad.
The question of the distribution of knowledge
and the need for a free flow of information is impor-
tant. We should all do our best to make certain that
scientific discoveries in medicine are quickly and wide-
ly distributed. The primary goal is to use medical
discoveries to develop better methods to diagnose,
prevent, and cure diseases. Today, this often requires
that an intellectual property be secured, which may
delay publication of a discovery. The choice between
early publication and the development of a product
for the benefit of patients with a particular disease
is, in our minds, an easy one. More often, however,
these two goals go hand in hand, and no choice has
to be made.
JEFFREY R. GULCHER, M.D., PH.D.
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RULES FOR RESEARCH ON HUMAN 
GENETIC VARIATION — LESSONS 
FROM ICELAND
ESEARCH on genetic variation aims to under-
stand how genes function and requires the com-
parison of DNA samples from groups of individuals
to identify variations that might have importance for
health or disease.1 This work is easier if the samples
are linked to accurate medical records and genealog-
ic information. Iceland has medical records for all its
citizens going back to World War I and detailed ge-
nealogic information going back even further. Be-
cause Iceland’s small population (270,000) has long
been isolated and homogeneous, it is thought by
many to be an ideal place to search for disease-relat-
ed genes. Journalists have cavalierly labeled Iceland’s
“the most homogeneous population on earth”2 and
have described the country as an “island so inbred
that it is a happy genetic hunting ground.”3
In December 1998, at the instigation of a for-
profit U.S. corporation, deCODE genetics, and its
chief executive officer, Kári Stefánsson, Iceland’s par-
liament passed the Health Sector Database Act, which
authorized the minister of health to grant an exclu-
sive license to a for-profit corporation to create a
data base of the medical records of all Icelandic cit-
izens.4 The government of Iceland can use the data
base for planning and policy purposes, but the licen-
see has control over access to the data base for com-
mercial purposes for 12 years. Individually identifi-
able data may not be disclosed, and confidentiality
is protected by a variety of methods, including pen-
alties of up to three years in prison for violations. A
Data Protection Commission receives medical rec-
ords from physicians and hospitals and codes and
encrypts them before giving them to the licensee.
Similar projects are ongoing or under active discus-
sion in the United States,5 the United Kingdom,6
Sweden,7 and Estonia,8 and many others are likely to
follow. Thus, the Icelandic experience may provide
lessons and guidance.
In early 2000, the Icelandic minister of health
granted the data-base license to Íslensk erfdagrein-
ing, a wholly owned Icelandic subsidiary of deCODE.
Opposition to the project has developed and in-
cludes the Iceland Medical Association. Dissent seems
to be fueled primarily by a belief that participation
in the data base has been foisted on the citizens
without time for proper debate, that measures to
protect privacy are inadequate for a for-profit ven-
ture, that academic researchers will not have proper
access to the data, and that individual consent should
be required before medical records are included in
the data base.
Medical records will be included in the data bank
unless a person “opts out” of the system by notify-
R
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ing his or her physician. Research on humans re-
quires consent, but research on data from medical
records that cannot be linked to individual patients
has often been considered an exception to this gen-
eral rule.9,10 Nonetheless, because of the commercial
nature of the data bank and its for-profit research
agenda, I believe individual consent should have been
required. Moreover, if deCODE is correct in assert-
ing that it has the overwhelming support of the pop-
ulation, obtaining individual informed consent should
not have been difficult.11 Creating an “opt-out” al-
ternative was not well justified by deCODE; this op-
tion cannot be exercised by children or incompetent
people, and it provided those who are opposed to
the plan with a focus for their criticism. By May
2000, it had been reported that more than 18,000
Icelanders (more than 10 percent of the adult pop-
ulation) had opted out of the research plan.12 A
lawsuit to challenge the entire statute is also being
planned by an organization formed just to fight de-
CODE’s project, the Association of Icelanders for
Ethics in Science and Medicine.12 DeCODE was thus
right to warn prospective investors, in the stock reg-
istration form submitted to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in March 2000, that “ethical
and privacy concerns may limit our ability to develop
. . . and may lead to litigation against us or the Ice-
landic government.”13
The primary purpose of deCODE is to collect
and analyze DNA samples for commercial purposes.
It is therefore surprising that nothing in the Icelan-
dic statute specifically authorizes this activity or de-
scribes how it is to be accomplished.4 Because of this
omission, the issues of community consultation and
benefit and individual consent and benefit for re-
search on genetic variation have yet to be dealt with
in any detail in Iceland. How should they be handled?
COMMUNITY CONSULTATION
AND BENEFIT
DNA studies could characterize all Icelanders as a
group (e.g., by identifying them as people who are
more or less likely to have a specific gene or muta-
tion than other populations). Because any finding
could lead to stigmatization, prejudice, and discrim-
ination against the Icelandic people, the Icelandic
people should be consulted before any genetic re-
search is done on a countrywide scale. The passage
of the medical-records data-base statute is evidence
of at least some prior community consultation and
approval of the medical-records plan, but the statute
provides no information on how a DNA data base
should be constructed, how it should run, who should
have access to it, or what control individuals should
have over their DNA samples once they are stored
in it. DeCODE has no monopoly or preferred posi-
tion with regard to a DNA data base, unlike the med-
ical-records data base, and any entity or corporation
can construct such a data base.14 Thus, action by the
democratic Icelandic parliament on this issue, which
would be an indication of the community’s willing-
ness to participate, though desirable, is not neces-
sary. Rather, what is required is a great deal of public
discussion, so that all viewpoints can be aired and
opposition can be expressed and addressed.1,15,16 The
goals of such community consultation are two: to
determine if there is principled opposition to the
plan (and if so, whether the research should proceed
at all) and to give individual citizens the information
they need to decide whether they want to participate
personally in the research.
Moreover, research should not be conducted on a
population, even research related to migration pat-
terns or the evolution of a genome, unless the ben-
efit to the population is likely to outweigh the risks.1,17
In this case, there is the prospect of economic gain
for the country and scientific knowledge that would
lead to new drugs or treatments. This may be suffi-
cient benefit to justify the research, but it seems un-
likely that the citizens of this welfare state would
willingly make a large gift of their DNA to a for-
profit U.S. corporation. The capital markets, on the
other hand, are less likely to pay high prices for
shares in a company that has an open-access policy
for DNA information than for shares in one with a
restrictive policy.18 The community should have a re-
alistic opportunity to benefit from the use of their
DNA in research. Scientific benefit seems more like-
ly if collected genetic information is made widely
available. If it is restricted, financial benefit may be
more likely, but only to the corporation. According-
ly, it is critical that both the procedures for access
and the financial aspects of the genetic-variation ven-
ture be spelled out and agreed to in advance. The
Icelandic government seems to have made a bad finan-
cial deal.11 The Icelandic government can, of course,
make its own deal, but the deal would have been
better had the government bargained with deCODE
for a percentage ownership in the company.
INDIVIDUAL CONSENT
Although a community can approve a research
project, it cannot legally or ethically require individ-
ual members of the community to participate.1 That
is one reason why the term “community consulta-
tion” is more accurate than “community consent.”1,15
Individual persons have the ethical and legal right
not to be research subjects without their voluntary,
competent, informed, and understanding consent.19
Although it is their DNA and not their bodies that
will be studied, individual consent must be ob-
tained for the collection of DNA (because it is re-
moved from the body), for storage (because the
DNA belongs to the individual), and for analysis
and the use of the information obtained by analysis
(at least if this information can be linked to the
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individual person). There is no real dispute about
these issues.1,5,9
A central controversy raised by DNA banks con-
taining identifiable DNA is whether the DNA can
be used for research protocols that were not known
about or consented to at the time the DNA was col-
lected or whether the researcher must go back to the
source of the DNA for consent to the new research.
The reason this is an issue, of course, is that DNA
can be duplicated almost indefinitely, and thus once
a researcher has a subject’s DNA sample, the stored
sample can be used for an infinite number of re-
search protocols in the future. Put another way, the
question is whether Icelanders can simply give their
DNA to deCODE with an authorization that reads
something like “deCODE and their assigns can per-
form whatever DNA-based genetic research they deem
important on my DNA unless and until I withdraw
this authorization.”
With Glantz and Roche, I have previously pro-
posed that new consent would not be necessary for
research if the DNA were stripped of its identifiers, so
that it could not be traced back to the individual per-
son.20,21 Such research with nonlinkable data, some-
times termed “anonymous” research, does not vio-
late individual privacy, since the individual source of
the DNA, by definition, cannot be identified and thus
cannot be harmed. On the other hand, if identifiers
are retained, then persons can be tested, screened,
and analyzed without informed consent each time a
new genetic research project is initiated. This is not
acceptable, because by definition such prior consent
is not informed consent (since the person does not
know what he or she is agreeing to); therefore, the
authorization is actually a waiver of consent, which
is unacceptable for research.1 The only question for
nonlinkable DNA samples, which are simply identi-
fied as “Icelandic,” is whether individual citizens are
willing to permit their DNA to be used in simplistic
and reductionist genetic research that could label the
Icelandic people in a negative way — for example, as
being prone to violence or alcoholism.
GENERIC GENETIC CONSENT 
AND WITHDRAWAL OF CONSENT
Medical-records research is often done without in-
dividual consent, and it seems reasonable to conclude
that, as long as confidentiality is properly protected,
a person can give consent, for example, for a re-
searcher to “examine my medical records for what-
ever is of medical or scientific significance.” But DNA
is different from a medical record for at least two
reasons. First, a medical record has already been cre-
ated and the contents are known (or can be known)
by the patient. A person’s identifiable DNA mole-
cule is more like a probabilistic “future diary” than
a record of past events.22 Moreover, it is written in a
code that has not yet been broken, so no one knows
either what it contains or how to decipher it. Wheth-
er, by whom, and for what purpose that diary should
be opened and read should be a decision made sole-
ly by the individual. There is a Viking saying that il-
lustrates the problem: “A man’s fate should be firmly
hidden to preserve his peace of mind.”23 The second
way in which DNA differs from medical records is
that genetic information has a history of misuse and
abuse by governments in eugenic sterilization and eu-
thanasia programs; this history should cause us to be
especially mindful of the rights of individuals.19
Equally important, at least since Nuremberg, is
that all research subjects have the right to withdraw
from a research project at any time.19,24 In this con-
text, withdrawal should involve the destruction of
the DNA sample provided by the subject; to pre-
serve and honor this right, subjects should have the
right to order their DNA sample destroyed at any
time.20 The most likely reason for such a demand
would be that the subject did not approve of the di-
rection in which the research was going or the deci-
sion to make particular diseases or conditions the
subject of the research. Thus, in order for the right
of withdrawal to be meaningful, deCODE should
keep the people whose DNA they have banked in-
formed about its research agenda through periodic
mailings and perhaps a newsletter. Because the med-
ical data base would primarily be used for genetic re-
search, individual subjects should also have the right
to have all their medical data deleted from the data
base at any time — a right that does not currently
exist in Iceland.
With periodic updates on research projects and a
simple method to withdraw from further research,
consent to broad categories of research should be
permissible. For example, consent to something like
“any and all research projects designed to locate genes
implicated in cancers of any kind” seems acceptable,
whereas consent to “any and all kinds of behavioral
genetic research” does not. The former is straight-
forward and understandable. The latter, however, is
vague and could apply to potential research projects
(such as a search for a gene determining alcoholism
or violence) in which many, if not most, people
would not want to be involved, because of the du-
bious scientific merit of such projects and their po-
tential to stigmatize the entire population. Likewise,
a blanket consent to non–hypothesis-based “data
dredging” in the genetic data base would be unac-
ceptably vague.
If the research subject is a minor, no one should be
permitted to waive the child’s privacy interests by do-
nating the child’s DNA for research on adult-onset
diseases. Only adults should be eligible to partici-
pate in such DNA-based research in which identifi-
able samples are used. The privacy rights of children
should be protected by a rule, which does not cur-
rently exist in Iceland, that their identifiable DNA
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cannot be collected for research that does not con-
cern childhood diseases.20,25
DNA AND MEDICAL RECORDS
IN THE FUTURE
DNA molecules are entirely separate from medical
records. In the future, however, the DNA molecule
and the medical record are likely to merge into one
when it becomes possible to sequence a person’s en-
tire genome and put that information on a computer
chip or disk. This is not deCODE’s current project,
but we should not wait until this step is taken to ex-
plore its implications. The most important questions
would then be who has the authority to make such
a disk in the first place; who owns the disk; who
controls the use of the disk; and whether the disk
containing the genome should be treated as special-
ly protected medical information, as is the case for
psychiatric and drug-dependency records? In clinical
settings, it seems reasonable to treat such a disk as
containing particularly private and sensitive medical
information. It also seems reasonable to permit pa-
tients to agree to have their entire genome scanned
without detailing the tens of thousands of tests that
would be run. This is akin to consent to a battery of
tests during an annual physical examination.26 
On the other hand, in a research setting, or when
a specific genetic disorder is suspected, the creation
and use of an individual patient’s genome disk should
be subject to the informed consent of the patient.
And since they can be both separated from the med-
ical record and readily recreated, research subjects
should retain the right to have the files containing
their genetic information destroyed at any time.
Iceland’s experience with deCODE provides a use-
ful catalyst for formulating fair and ethical rules for
research on genetic variation. The Icelandic experi-
ence demonstrates that people are concerned about
how genetic research is done, that medical-records
research and DNA-based research are not the same,
that community consultation is necessary but not suf-
ficient to justify DNA-based research ethically, that
the probable benefits of such research should be
spelled out as clearly as possible, and that interna-
tional standards for consent to and withdrawal from
research should apply directly to research on human
genetic variation. Rules for such research will retain
their relevance even after it becomes possible to trans-
fer all the genetic-sequence information in a DNA
molecule to a computer disk.
GEORGE J. ANNAS, J.D., M.P.H.
Boston University Schools of Medicine and Public Health
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